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The Impact of Reforms and Privatisation on Firms’ Conduct in the 
Presence of Interconnected Conglomerates and Weak and Inefficient 
Regulatory Institutions 
 
Abstract 
 
Critics of broad reforms, including privatisation, argue that these policies may lead to the creation of rent-
seeking interconnected large business groups in the absence of a strong regulatory framework and well-
functioning courts. The empirical evidence in a developing country context in particular is however still 
scarce. Based on a case study of the Pakistani cement industry, this paper fills this gap. Our study shows 
that due to interconnected conglomerates’ tactics, such as exclusionary practices, the acquisition of smaller 
competitor firms and the addition of significant capacities, the industry has witnessed a stable degree of 
seller concentration after broader reforms including privatisation. Consequently, colluding conglomerate 
firms have been able to maintain control over supply and prices for two decades in the post-reform period, 
despite allegations of tacit collusion leading to the imposition of fines and the issuing of warnings by the 
regulator, which is, however, weak and inefficient.  
.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the reasons for privatisation and other broader reforms was the belief that these would supposedly 
increase competition levels and this would in turn lead to lower and stable prices, optimum output levels 
and greater levels of efficiency. However, there is a strong indication of growing dissatisfaction with such 
reforms and the benefits of privatisation are being questioned in both developing and developed countries 
due to the anticompetitive behaviour of privatised firms which have colluded with other competitor firms 
from the industry to exploit market power. The anti-privatisation argument has been that any improved 
financial performance could have been due to a change in the dynamics of industry competition rather than 
a change of ownership per se. Furthermore, some authors argue that due to the strategic oligopolistic 
interaction of firms, improved enterprise productivity seldom translates into an overall increase in the 
welfare of the consumers and society. These benefits generally accrue to interconnected conglomerates and 
firms’ shareholders and creditors. But interestingly, the impact of explicit/tacit collusion on supply and 
pricing dynamics has been studied comprehensively using theoretical models, but empirical evidence is still 
scarce. This gap widens even more when the assumptions of stronger regulatory institutions, an efficient 
legal system and fair play by the interconnected conglomerates are violated. 
 
Following the international trend and under pressure from multilateral donor agencies, such as the World 
Bank and IMF, the Pakistani government introduced a deregulation policy through institutional and 
managerial changes in the 1980s. Subsequently, this deregulation policy was complemented by introducing 
mass privatisation of state-owned firms belonging to manufacturing and service industries in the early and 
mid-1990s. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, more reforms were introduced, including adhering to 
international auditing and disclosure standards, and setting up and strengthening regulatory authorities to 
address post-privatisation complaints of collusive practices. Rather disappointingly, since the time of 
privatisation and broader reforms, Pakistani cement industry in particular has been regularly accused of tacit 
collusion on the part of large interconnected business groups to manipulate prices and supply quantity, and 
consequently, there have been a number of investigations by regulator, courts and law enforcement 
agencies.  
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Interestingly, despite widespread claims in newspapers of anticompetitive behaviour by cement producers, 
a number of court cases, stay orders, political interventions to halt or withdraw investigations and fines, no 
comprehensive empirical study has been conducted so far in this regard using rigorous econometric 
techniques. One of the descriptive study conducted by the Pakistani competition authority in 2008 
concluded “At this point-in-time the Commission has not noted sufficient evidence to suggest there being 
one (cartel/collusion). The cartel question hence, remains an open one”. But in the same report it stated 
subsequently “nevertheless, the Commission cannot completely rule out the possibility that this across the 
board simultaneous price increase may have arisen from collusive behaviour of the incumbent cement 
producers”1. Ghulam and Jaffry (2015) assessed the impact of the aforementioned broad reforms, including 
privatisation, on the Pakistani cement industry and concluded that following these reforms, the industry 
experienced significant productivity growth due to technological progress. However, similar to other studies 
in this area, Ghulam and Jaffry (2015) ignore the impact of the privatisation policy on firms’ conduct in 
terms of price setting and supply dynamics and more specifically investigation of collusion practices by 
privatised and private firms.  
 
The tacit collusion accusation of the Pakistani cement industry after privatisation and reforms and lack of 
empirical investigation to ascertain the claim is however not a surprising result as studies on the impact of 
privatisation on collusion practices have not been forthcoming worldwide. Correia-da-Silva and Pinho 
(2017) argued that most of the existing literature does not take into account the possible impact of 
privatisation on private firms’ incentives to collude. By using theoretical model, the authors concluded that 
“privatization always makes collusion among private firms easier to sustain, and thus it may happen that 
collusion is not sustainable before privatization but becomes sustainable afterward“. The authors argued 
that increase in number of private firms helps achieve the sustainability of collusion. 
  
By extending the scope and contributing to the empirical literature on the impact of privatisation and 
broader reforms on competitive conditions generally and tacit collusion in particular in the context of 
developing countries, this study aims to establish whether or not the privatisation and deregulation policy 
                                               
1 http://www.cc.gov.pk/images/Downloads/research_and_publications/Recent_Cement_Price_Hike.pdf    
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has made the industry more competitive by evaluating the conduct of producers after acquiring the power 
to set prices and supply quantity. Alongside empirically testing the collusion propensity after privatisation, 
this study contributes to debate on industry specific discussion of the collusion/cartel practices. There is 
continued and ever rising international academic interest in the assessment of the competitive condition of 
the cement industry. Authors such as, Rosenbaum and Sukharomana (2001), Zeidan and Resende (2009), 
Salvo (2010), Çelen and Gunalp (2010), Bejger (2011) and Hüschelrath et al. (2013) have evaluated the 
industry’s competitive conditions and collusive practices. But interestingly, majority of these studies are 
related to the relatively high income countries with established and strong regulatory institutions. Hence, 
the observations and conclusions of this study from a country known for inefficient and weak regulatory 
authorities and interconnected conglomerates will make a valuable contribution to the international 
literature, as well as providing some guidance for regulatory and competition authorities in the developing 
countries in general and Pakistan in particular.    
 
By using a wide variety of new and old methods for testing and screening collusion practices, the main 
findings of this study can be summarised as follows. Pakistani cement producers have in fact established an 
effective tacit collusion mechanism that has allowed them to increase prices beyond the increase in the cost 
of production, based on the production of less than competitive output levels. The conspirator 
conglomerate firms have been able to maintain this tacit collusion for almost two decades, mainly due to 
the inefficient and weak regulatory and legal system, the acquisition of small and medium-sized competitor firms, 
significant capacity additions, exclusionary practices, the formation of a powerful producer association, and 
strong and interconnected business conglomerates.  
 
This study suggests that broader reforms, including privatisation in developing countries, will not bring 
about the desired policy aim of creating a ‘level playing field’ and making the industries competitive and 
efficient without an effective, efficient and authoritative regulatory framework and efficient legal and court 
procedures, backed by legislation, as well as a reduction of government interventions in investigations of 
market abuse and the subsequent collection of fines. This study further argues that the regulatory body 
should keep a close eye on some particular industries with higher sunk costs. Those industries with 
   
5 
 
transportation issues such as cement due to the bulky nature of the product and exclusionary practices that 
it is easy to exercise significant market power and form tacit collusion due to the building of larger 
production capacities, among other factors, need to be carefully regulated and monitored.      
 
The rest of this paper comprises seven more sections. Sections two contains information on the state of 
play in terms of competition policy in Pakistan (regulatory framework, institutions and issues). The next 
two sections, three and four, provide a discussion of economics of tacit collusion and its relevance for the 
Pakistani cement industry and then summarise relevant work in the area of privatisation/deregulation and 
their effects on competition, collusion and conduct of the firms. Section five contains a discussion of the 
theoretical underpinnings and methodology framework of the study. The data sources and construction of 
relevant variables are then explained in section six. Section seven contains the empirical analysis and 
estimation of the different competition indices and estimates related to conduct parameter models. Finally, 
the last section concludes with a discussion of the results and some important lessons for regulatory 
authorities.  
 
2. Competition policy in Pakistan – regulatory framework, institutions and issues 
The first serious effort in regard to setting up of regulatory framework in Pakistan was made in 1970 with 
the introduction of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices law (MRTPO, 1970). The main 
objective of this law was to put an end to rising industrial concentration and discourage monopolistic 
practices. Subsequently, the Monopoly Control Authority (MCA) was created to implement this law. The 
significance and power of the MRTPO was seriously compromised in 1981, when it was made part of the 
Corporate Law Authority (CLA). The main job of the CLA was to register new companies and look into 
the corporate affairs of both new and existing companies. The MCA gained its authority back in 1994, but 
remained toothless in terms of implementing its decisions and warnings due to the lack of a serious attitude 
on the part of political governments, which feared a backlash from industrial conglomerates that could have 
resulted in the reduction of already low foreign direct investment (FDI) in the case of action being taken 
against the violators of competition laws.  
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The MRTPO was repealed in 2007 and was replaced with a new ordinance in 2007 – the Competition 
Commission Ordinance (CCO, 2007) – which was modelled on European competition laws. The MCA 
was dissolved and a new regulatory body, the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP), was created. 
Alongside other functions, the main responsibilities of the CCP are to protect consumers’ interests by 
restricting producers’ abuse of dominance and market power. In 2010, the CCO was converted into a full 
law and was subsequently passed by parliament (CA, 2010), notwithstanding considerable opposition from 
big business lobbies. The CCP has undertaken a few investigative studies on price increases and has 
provided advice to the government on a range of issues. However, the role played by the new regulator in 
the identification and curbing of monopoly powers has also been widely criticised since its establishment. 
It is commonly understood that the CCP has been unable to curb tacit collusion in a number of industries, 
such as those related to cement, sugar, ghee (cooking oil), automobiles and finance.  
 
The national newspapers are full of stories on how such collusion is harming consumers’ interests. 
Interference in the working of the CCP has meant that fines imposed by the Commission have never been 
recovered. Hence, the Commission has been unable to create a viable deterrence for illegal anticompetitive 
practices. The watchdog role of the CCP, in particular, has been seriously compromised due to its lack of 
capacity in terms of conducting technical studies that can be defended in a court of law. Based on an 
examination of almost all studies conducted by the CCP so far, available on its website, it can be concluded 
that not a single study matches the rigour and technical nature of the studies that are common to regulatory 
authorities from advanced economies. Most of these studies are in fact cost accounting exercises without 
any serious economic and econometric analysis. 
 
3. Economics of tacit collusion and the Pakistani cement industry 
Tacit collusion can lead oligopolistic firms to achieve monopolistic outcomes, leading to reduced and 
inefficient equilibrium output, higher prices, and lower consumer welfare (Ciliberto et al., 2017). A number 
of authors such as Ivaldi et al. (2007) suggested that the threat of retaliation in the case of any attempt by a 
firm to deviate from collusive path to achieve short run benefits would ensure long run sustainability of 
collusion as well as high prices. More specifically, the magnitude and possibility of severe retaliation as well 
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as deviation from collusive path depends on the nature of some structural variables, demand side 
developments, and supply side factors. The empirical and theoretical literature on collusion (both tacit and 
explicit) suggest that collusion is sustainable when firms are putting sufficient weight on future profits, there 
are few competitors, market shares, cost and capacities are symmetric, entry barriers are significant, 
interaction of firms are frequent, market is transparent in terms of output and input prices and is growing, 
customers have lower buying power and significant cross ownership exists. . In the case of the Pakistani 
cement industry and its product, all these factors are likely to be relevant as discussed subsequently. 
 
One of the immediate after-effects of the transfer of ownership as a result of broad reform, privatisation 
and the subsequent mergers and acquisitions has been the emergence of few powerful industrial groups 
that are interlinked, and a tendency to cooperate in setting prices and production quotas. The 
underutilisation of capacity and the sustained rise in output prices since 1991 are often cited as a case in 
point. Immediately after reforms, majority of the firms added significant capacities to maintain their market 
share and replaced old technology (wet) with relatively better (semi-dry) or advanced (dry). This is true for 
the former public sector firms. The newer and older privately firms were either already using new 
technology or started operation with advanced production process. As discussed above, alongside 
privatisation, a series of post-reform mergers and acquisitions of former publically owned firms as well 
firms set-up under private ownership but subsequently not a part of interlinked conglomerates and closure 
of smaller size private producer firms (see Table 1) has perhaps also contributed to a concentration of 
powers. New privately established and owned firms that started their operations in early and mid-1990s and 
have survived to date are also part of strong industrial groups with inter-linkages in businesses. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
To manage an effective conspiracy, cartels often establish committees or secretariats to collect and share 
market sales intelligence. Alternatively, cartels may be operated in tandem with trade associations that 
perform the same function. These trade associations, by pooling information on industry trends, improve 
a cartel’s ability to anticipate demand shocks, thereby reducing price dispersion (Connor, 2005). In the case 
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of the Pakistani cement industry, the establishment of the producer association, All Pakistan Cement 
Manufacturer Association (APCMA), immediately after privatisation confirms Connor’s (2005) point. The 
role of opportunistic behaviour and deviation from collusive path as well as information asymmetry in 
terms of cost and capacities have been minimum due to the interdependence of conglomerates leading to 
cross ownership and organisation of regular meetings among APCMA members to share information on 
capacity, production and output prices. In the backdrop of these above mentioned points, evidence of 
formation of tacit collusion and deterioration of competition levels is/would be hardly surprising. 
 
4. Collusion, firms’ conduct, and reforms – review of the empirical literature  
A vast body of literature (both theoretical and empirical) exists on the impact of tacit or explicit collusion 
on the behaviour and performance of individual firms and industries. Cournot (1838) and Marshall (1890) 
stated that a lack of competitive pressure would result in the reduction of output accompanied by increasing 
prices. Bolotova et al. (2008) calculated that conspirator firms managed to raise prices by 9 and 25 cents per 
pound in the short term relative to non-collusive periods. Bolotova (2009) further estimated that cartel 
overcharges amount to around 20% median worldwide. Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) also found evidence of 
higher price bids by seafood supplier colluders in the United States. Frank and Schliffke (2013) estimated 
an overcharge in the range of 7–9% compared to non-collusive competitive prices. Hüschelrath et al. (2013) 
estimated this overcharge to be between 20.3% and 26.5%. Similarly, Andreoli-Versbach and Frank (2015) 
stated that producers were able to increase prices by 20–30% as a result of collusions.  
 
Having broadly agreed on the significant impact of collusion on prices as discussed above, some authors 
have looked into the impact of broad reforms, including privatisation (which were introduced in part to 
promote level playing field), on the dynamics of competitive conditions and resulting prices of individual 
firms as well as overall industry. Broadly speaking, the available published empirical literature on the impact 
of broad reforms/privatisation on competition and prices displays mixed evidence. Ho (2010) looked at 
the effect of easing regulations on the banking industry in Hong Kong. Overall, the author found that 
deregulation had a positive role, with the industry becoming more competitive and consumers being better 
off after deregulation. Cetin and Benk (2011) evaluated the effects of deregulation on competition in the 
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Turkish airline industry. The study found that the policy had a positive effect on competitiveness with 
consumers benefiting the most. Okoeguale (2015) studied the impact of deregulation in 1996 on the US 
telecommunications industry and found that it increased merger activity due to increasing levels of 
competition. The study concluded that “deregulation opened both the local and long-distance telecom 
markets to competition from new communication technologies, resulting in a significant increase in initial 
public offering (IPO) and merger activity” (Okoeguale, 2015, p. 1).  
 
However, some authors have questioned the positive impact of reforms on competition. Yildirim and 
Mohanty (2010) investigated the effect of deregulation on state-level competition in the US banking market 
over the period 1976–2005. The study concluded that US banks in general operated under monopolistic 
competition during the period examined and became less competitive due to the rising market power of 
large-sized banks as a result of geographic deregulation. Maudos and Solís (2011) looked at the role of 
deregulation in determining competition in the Mexican banking industry in the period 1993–2005. The 
empirical evidence pointed towards the existence of monopolistic competition. The Lerner index showed 
an increase in competition in the loan market but a decrease in the deposit market in the post-reform period. 
Thus, the study questioned the effectiveness of the new regulatory regime in promoting competition in the 
industry. 
 
Recently, some studies such as Correia-da-Silva and Pinho (2017) have developed theoretical models to 
show how private firms after privatisation could collude and harm the welfare of the consumer. In 
particular, the authors looked at the long term sustainability of the collusion and how could privatisation 
‘make collusion among private firms easier to sustain’ given the fact that it could have been not possible 
before. The authors labelled this ‘the coordinated effects of privatisation’ which could be substantial if there are 
higher number of private firms facing the smaller slope of marginal cost. In this case, the authors conclude 
that privatisation could be surely welfare detrimental. The negative or uncertain impact of reforms on 
competition and resulting prices due to oligopolistic market interaction is not however only limited to 
developing countries. Liberalisation and privatisation and resulting restructuring programs in network 
industries have been evaluated by a number of studies at greater length for developed countries. Some of 
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the case studies relate to European electricity and telecommunication markets. Authors such as Fiorio and 
Florio (2013), Hyland (2013) suggested that the impact of liberalisation in Western Europe on prices was 
smaller and more uncertain or at best it has no impact on prices. Almost similar conclusions were drawn 
by Razeghi et al (2017) for the state of California in USA. The study by Bacchiocchi et al (2011) concludes 
that privatisation was not able to significantly influence prices in the EU telecommunication sector.  
 
Surprisingly, few studies have as yet examined the level of competition in Pakistan, with most of the studies 
conducted so far being limited to the financial sector. One such example is by Khan (1998), who concluded 
that there was an increase in the level of competition as a result of reforms introduced in the early 1990s. 
The study also noted that whilst competition was increasing at the time, it was still nonetheless very limited. 
In a cross-country study within the sub-continent, Perera et al. (2006) show that banking profits are earned 
under monopolistic conditions. This study also looked into the nature of the banking business and 
concluded that in the case of the Pakistani banking industry, fee earning business is more competitive, while 
for Indian banking, interest earned on traditional banking activity, such as deposit taking and loan provision, 
is more competitive. 
 
This study contributes by evaluating firms conduct in both pre and post reforms period. Compared to a 
number of studies discussed above, the choice of the cement industry in a developing country context 
further provides an interesting and distinctive setting where the role of regulators, competition laws, legal 
system, and institutions could be evaluated more thoroughly particularly in an industry where ex ante chances 
of collusion and cartel are likely to be very high.    
 
5. Investigation of collusion practices – methodology 
A number of methods have been developed and used to detect collusive behaviour of the firms and 
evaluation of competition levels. These include variation in cost (Panzar and Rosse [1987]), rotations of 
demand (Bresnahan [1982]), and conduct regime analysis (Porter [1983]) among many others. We start with 
simple screening mechanism to detect any collusion practice and supplement this with the empirical 
assessment of market power using conduct parameter models (CPM) such as overcharge estimation and 
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conduct parameter λ. These methods are discussed in detail in the following sub-sections, including the 
estimation strategy. Subsequently, we relate the findings with regulatory and institutional issues to further 
understand the outcome.  
 
 5.1 Traditional non-parametric competition indices 
Traditional non-parametric competition indices include simple ratios, such as the Herfindahl index (H), the 
concentration index (C3) measured by the top three firms’ market share and mark-up measured by the 
price–cost margin (PCM). For the sake of comparison and robustness, this study calculates and uses three 
different versions of the Herfindahl index, using total assets, production capacity and gross sales volume. 
Similarly, two different versions of price–cost margins are calculated, simple and weighted. Following the 
empirical literature, the weights are determined by the market share of each firm in aggregated total assets 
of the industry. These methods are further supplemented by analysis of the trend in capacity utilisation (to 
measure the extent of under-supply under collusion arrangements) and the distribution of the nominal 
output price (mean, skewness and kurtosis).   
 
5.2 Estimation of overcharge – “before and after approach” cartel/collusion formation 
Together with the establishment of antitrust rules and a well-functioning legal system that compensates the 
victims of anticompetitive behaviour, the derivation of robust estimates of the damage cause is very 
important in the implementation of antitrust rules. In particular, robust and coherent overcharge estimates 
are necessary for the private enforcement of antitrust rules. Three methods are commonly used to quantify 
the damage caused by the anticompetitive behaviour of firms after the forming of tacit or explicit collusion. 
These include the use of dummy variables, the dynamic treatment effect and the straight line method. The 
dummy variable method compares the output price after/before and during the period in which firms 
operate under price/quantity fixing.  
 
In this framework, a simple multivariate linear regression model with price as the dependent variable and 
input prices as independent variables is used. A dummy variable with a value equal to ‘1’ for the 
collusion/cartel arrangement period and ‘0’ otherwise is introduced to evaluate the impact of 
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collusion/cartel arrangements on price. A statistically significant and positive coefficient for this dummy 
variable represents a price overcharge (premium) compared to the non-cartel competitive price. To achieve 
the robustness of the premium estimates, a number of control variables are introduced, such as prevailing 
market conditions and the economic and regulatory environment. One of the main advantages of this 
simple method is that it is straightforward, less time consuming than others and makes fewer demands 
concerning data requirements. Due to its simplicity and straightforward economic interpretation, this 
method has been used extensively in academic research, as well as in court proceedings around the world.  
 
As discussed above, Pakistani cement producers have been accused of forming a collusion/cartel many 
times since the initiation of the privatisation policy (1992, 1998, 2003 and most recently in 2008). Hence, 
in a way, the whole post reform/privatisation period could be treated as a potential collusion period. For 
the analysis in this study, the whole post-reform period was divided into two: 1991–1995 covering the 
immediate impact of reform and privatisation, and 1996–2011, comprising more mature period. The basic 
regression model is thus specified as follows: 
𝑝 = 𝛿0 + 𝛾𝑊 + 𝜂𝑞 + 𝜙𝑋1 + 𝜏𝑋2 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝜋1𝑑1991−95 + 𝜋2𝑑1996−2011 + 𝜀 
 (1) 
The nominal cement price (𝑝) in the above model is determined by various factors: a vector of input prices 
𝑊 (comprising furnace oil, coal, limestone and workers’ wages); firms’ supply of output, represented by 
the quantity of cement sold (𝑞); a vector of the firm and industry environment variables (𝑋1), comprising 
competitive conditions measured by the industry Herfindhal index; firms’ specific cost-inefficiency levels; 
firm size; role of entry and exit of firms, represented by a ratio 1/((𝑁 + 1)), where 𝑁 is the number of 
firms; firm ownership type (privatised and private); and firm geographic location. 𝑋2 in the above model is 
a vector of the macroeconomic environment variables comprising GDP growth rates and the ratio of 
exports to GDP. The use of nominal prices rather than real prices as the dependent variable is similar to 
the approach adopted by Blanckenburg et al. (2011), among others. This can further be justified on the 
grounds that inflation has been in double digits consistently in both competitive and potentially collusive 
time periods. 
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To observe the impact of collusion on prices, the study uses producer prices (list prices or gross prices 
inclusive of government taxes such as sales tax and excise duty) because it is believed that any collusion 
would have happened among producers at this price. To derive the estimate of overcharge, two dummy 
variables are introduced, 𝑑1991−95 = ‘1’ for the period 1991–1995 and ‘0’ otherwise to take account of the 
initial impact of reforms and 𝑑1996−2011 = ‘1’ for 1996 onward for the second phase of reforms and ‘0’ 
otherwise. A time trend variable (𝑡) is also included to capture technological change, etc. Some authors 
have suggested that (𝑞) could be endogenously determined and hence simple linear regression may not be 
suitable. The endogeneity of a regressor may arise due to omitted variables, two-way causality and 
measurement errors, etc. Hence, in the empirical specification, cement demand is instrumented with the 
GDP growth rate, production capacity, the base interest rate, the number of firms and two dummy variables 
for production technology (semi-advanced and advanced). All the variables except dummies were log 
transformed prior to the estimation of the model.  
 
5.3 Conduct parameter model - Bresnahan’s (1982) approach  
Following Shaffer (1993), it is assumed that the goal of a firm is to maximise profit. Under conditions of 
perfect competition, the firm’s marginal revenue will be equal to its average revenue, or price. Hence, the 
firm will continue to increase production until its marginal cost is equal to the output price. Similarly, under 
conditions in which perfect competition does not exist, where the firm’s own actions have some effect 
upon the market price, marginal revenue diverges from price. In line with Bresnahan (1982), the firm’s 
demand function can be written as 𝑞 = 𝐷(𝑝, 𝑦, 𝛼) + 𝜀 and the true marginal revenue function with semi-
elasticity of demand is 𝑚𝑟 = 𝑝 + ℎ(𝑞, 𝑦, 𝛼) = 𝑝 + 𝑞 (
Δ𝑞
Δ𝑃
)⁄ , where 𝑝 is the product price, 𝑞 is the output, 𝑦 is 
a vector of exogenous variables, 𝛼 is a vector of estimated demand parameters and Δ to represent change 
in quantity and price .  
 
However, the firm’s perceived marginal revenue function is 𝑚𝑟𝑝 = 𝑝 + 𝜆ℎ(𝑞, 𝑦, 𝛼), where 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 1 is a 
new parameter that can be estimated and represents the distinction between demand and marginal revenue. 
The 𝜆 term is included to represent the degree to which individual firms are aware of the divergence of 
average revenue (or price) from marginal revenue. If we assume firms’ marginal cost function where ω and 
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𝛽 represent vector of input prices and parameter estimates of 𝑐(𝑞, ω, 𝛽), the profit-maximising firm is likely 
to set perceived marginal revenue equal to marginal cost such that 𝑝 = 𝑐(𝑞, ω, 𝛽) − 𝜆ℎ(𝑞, 𝑦, 𝛼) + 𝜂. Here 𝜂 
is a random error term. When 𝜆 is zero, firms behave as if the two are identical (hence indicating that the 
firm at least believes that it is perfectly competitive and therefore sets the price equal to the marginal cost). 
When 𝜆 is equal to one, it indicates a perfect understanding of the separation of price from marginal revenue 
and is indicative of monopolist behaviour or a collusive oligopoly. The closeness of the actual value of 𝜆 to 
either of these two competitive extremes indicates the relative extent to which firms understanding to be 
operating in different competitive conditions. In this way, 𝜆 can be seen as an index of market power.  
 
Elementary economic theory also suggests that output of the industry will be lower and prices higher under 
conditions of monopoly compared to the perfect competition alternative. The extent to which the industry 
price and output deviates from conditions of perfect competition can be approximated by the inverse of 
the 𝜆 value. The market price deviates from the competitive price by −𝜆𝑞 (
Δ𝑞
Δp
)⁄ , while the deviation in 
quantity is determined by dividing the competitive output by 𝛥𝑞/𝛥𝑝, multiplied by the deviation in price. 
The key to the methodology, therefore, is the accurate calculation of 𝜆. The first step in the calculation of 
this term is a demand function that is representative of the true demand curve. We approximate the demand 
function as follows: 
𝑞 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑝 + 𝛼2𝑦 + 𝛼3𝑝𝑧 + 𝛼4𝑧 + 𝛼5𝑝𝑦 + 𝛼6𝑦𝑧 + 𝑒 
         (2) 
where 𝑞 is the quantity of outputs (quantity of cement produced and sold), 𝑝 is the respective price of 
cement sold per tonne (total gross sales divided by total cement quantity sold), 𝑦 is approximated by 
demand-enhancing economic activity (GDP growth rate), 𝑧 is a proxy substitute for cement (as there is no 
perfect substitute for cement, we use construction activity growth) and e is the residual or error term. The 
multiplicative terms 𝑝𝑧, 𝑝𝑦 and 𝑦𝑧 are included to estimate 𝜆 through the rotation of the demand curve2.  
 
                                               
2 See Bresnahan (1982) for detail on how some of the exogenous variables could change the slope of the demand 
curve rather than shift in intercept.  
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The second stage in the estimation of 𝜆 is a marginal cost function obtained through a popular translog 
cost function specification as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑐 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛𝑞 + 0.5 ∗ 𝛽2(𝑙𝑛𝑞)
2 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑛ω1 + 𝛽4 𝑙𝑛ω2 + 𝛽5 𝑙𝑛ω3 + 𝛽6 𝑙𝑛ω4 + 0.5 ∗ 𝛽7 (𝑙𝑛ω1)
2  +  0.5 ∗ 𝛽8 (𝑙𝑛ω2)
2  
+  0.5 ∗ 𝛽9(𝑙𝑛ω3)
2  + 0.5 ∗ 𝛽10(𝑙𝑛ω4)
2  + 𝛽11𝑙𝑛ω1𝑙𝑛ω2  + 𝛽12 𝑙𝑛ω1𝑙𝑛ω3  + 𝛽13 𝑙𝑛ω1𝑙𝑛ω4
+ 𝛽14 𝑙𝑛ω2𝑙𝑛ω3 + 𝛽15𝑙𝑛ω2𝑙𝑛ω4 + 𝛽16 𝑙𝑛ω3𝑙𝑛ω4 +  𝛽17 𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑙𝑛ω1 +  𝛽18 𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑙𝑛ω2 + 𝛽19 𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑙𝑛ω3  
+ 𝛽20 𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑙𝑛ω4 +  𝑒 
 (3) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝑐 represents the log of total costs (including production, distribution and administration, etc.), while 
𝑙𝑛ω1, 𝑙𝑛ω2, 𝑙𝑛ω3, 𝑙𝑛ω4 are exogenous input prices (log of: yearly employee wage rates, price of furnace oil, 
price of coal and price of limestone per tonne). The price of packing material is used to impose homogeneity 
on input prices. The implied marginal cost (𝑚𝑐) function is therefore as follows: 
𝑚𝑐 =
𝑐
𝑞
[𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑞 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝜔1 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝜔2 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝜔3 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝜔4]  
      (4) 
With equations (2) and (4) in place, the calculation of 𝜆 can be attempted. The supply relationship is 
estimated from the above equation, assuming a degree of market power (and hence influence over price), 
as well as profit maximisation on the part of the firms concerned:  
𝑝 = −
𝜆𝑞
[𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑧 + 𝑎5𝑦]
+
𝑐
𝑞
[𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑞 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛ω1 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛ω2 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛ω3 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛ω4]  + 𝑏7𝐷𝑞/[𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑧
+ 𝑎5𝑦] + 𝜇 
 (5) 
where μ represents the error or residual term, while D is a dummy variable used to represent the post-
reform period (dummy variable = ‘1’ for the post-reforms period and ‘0’ otherwise). From the above 
equations, 𝜆 is calculated to represent a measure of market power, where the value for firms operating 
under conditions of monopoly or collusive oligopoly should be higher than that of more competitive market 
conditions.  
 
6. Data  
Panel data covering the period 1986–2011 are used to estimate the various competition indices and conduct 
parameters estimates explained in the methodology section above. The data set used in this study 
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encompasses a much wider time post-reform period than most other such studies on the development of 
competition during the post-reform/privatisation period. To our knowledge, no similar study focusing on 
developing countries, except the recent work by Ghulam and Jaffry (2015), has been able to obtain 
comprehensive data on a time period of this length.  
 
Firm-level data on income, expenditures, and input/output prices were obtained from company annual 
reports, the Karachi Stock Exchange, the APCMA, the CCP, the former Expert Advisory Cell (Ministry of 
Production and Industries, Government of Pakistan), leading Pakistani stock brokerage houses in Karachi, 
individual firm websites, and personal contacts with authors in the field who have previously obtained such 
data for their use. The macroeconomic variables used in this study were sourced from various Government 
of Pakistan publications, such as economic surveys, etc. The final panel dataset used in this study comprises 
information on 21 firms (but varying over sample period due exit and entry) over a period of 26 years 
(encompassing 6 years pre and 20 years post privatisation period). The input price data for fuel, limestone 
and paper bags are at firm level for public sector firms before privatisation. Such data for private firms 
however is at the national level due to availability issues.  
 
7. Estimation and explanation of competition indices 
7.1 Traditional non-parametric competition indices  
As a preliminary empirical analysis, we start with the widely used traditional non-parametric measures of 
competition. Starting with the Herfindahl index (H1), this measure in Table 2 suggests no noticeable change 
in the post-reform period. The index value is not high and the market is not particularly concentrated; 
hence, the conditions are not conducive to the exercise of market power. In a further step, the Herfindahl 
index was constructed using two alternative measures: production capacity and gross sales volume. These 
Herfindahl indices (H2, and H3), based upon the alternative formulation, broadly confirm the above 
findings. The concentration index (C3), approximated by the top three firms’ market share shows a similar 
trend. Another traditional measure shown in Table 2, the price cost margin (weighted as well as un-
weighted), indicates a marginal decrease in competition during the immediate post-reform period (1991–
1995), but the estimates for the subsequent period indicate no significant change compared to the pre-
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reform period. The stability in the aforementioned three indices, indicating little change, could however 
suggest that cartel members were agreeing on market share at the time and subsequently maintained this 
throughout the sample period.  
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
Next, we turn to the assessment of the utilisation rates of available capacity to look for any evidence of 
underutilisation of technological resources to manipulate output and prices. The capacity utilisation rate is 
defined as actual output divided by the maximum output that could be produced by a given technology. 
Table 3 contains these rates and confirms that capacity utilisation increased significantly for two types of 
ownership firms (already in the private sector and privatised) during the early years of privatisation (from 
93% to 103% for privatised firms and 96% to 119% for private firms). The nonparametric rank sum test 
confirms that these differences are statistically significant. Public sector firms faced a slight reduction in 
their capacity utilisation during this period (but the difference is statistically insignificant). Firms, however, 
did not continue this trend and the industry as a whole witnessed a significant reduction (from 93% 77%) 
in capacity utilisation in the overall post-reform period. This is true for all firms, irrespective of ownership, 
and the decline is also statistically significant. 
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
Another simple method for detecting any tacit or explicit collusion among producer firms is to observe the 
price variance trend. Similar to studies conducted by regulatory authorities, Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006), 
Blanckenburg and Geist (2011) and Bolotova et al. (2008), this study used a price dispersion method to 
detect the anticompetitive (cartel) behaviour of firms. Connor (2005) argued that as a result of agreement 
on fixing lower than competitive production levels, higher than average cost facilities would have to be 
closed. This would reduce some degree of variability in producer costs and hence provide the incentive to 
cheat. High prices would dampen expected future market growth and this in turn would reduce the 
incentive for plant expansion and upgrades in lower-cost facilities, thus reducing the variability in prices. 
Blanchenburg and Geist (2009) found evidence of a decrease in variance during the cartel period due to the 
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need for cartel members to re-negotiate the prices among themselves. More specifically, the distribution of 
price changes under a cartel/collusion would have a relatively higher peak around zero. Hence, stability in 
the price variance during the period considered to be affected by tacit collusion could indicate the existence 
of price-fixing arrangements. Authors such as Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) have advocated the use of price 
variance, the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation as a data-screening device to detect the 
anticompetitive behaviour of firms.  
 
Figure 1 below indicates that that since 1991/1992, prices have increased exponentially and have kept rising 
except for a minor decline in three years. Morrison et al. (1996) suggested an interesting signalling 
mechanism of cartels and collusions detection whereby a price decrease of 25% or more in the current 
period compared to the previous period can be considered a case of price war and an increase of more than 
5%, an evidence of the end of collusion. In this case, a reduction of almost 25% happened in only two years 
(2007 and 2010). The standard deviation estimates do indeed confirm that the magnitude of deviation was 
lower in the period 1996–2011 compared to 1986–1995. Hence, the simultaneous reduction in the standard 
deviation (variance) and increase in price could perhaps signal a collusion practices. However, Bolotova 
(2008) argues that just one element could also indicate the presence of collusive behaviour. 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
A further confirmation of the above result is evident from Table 4, which shows the trend in nominal prices 
together with the distribution of third and fourth moments measured by skewness and kurtosis. It is clear 
from the trend that prices have increased continuously by around 7% per annum. The figures for price 
distribution – measured by skewness and covering the entire distribution of the data – indicate that the 
right-hand tail becomes shorter and prices become steadier. Similar to Blanckenburg et al. (2012), the study 
also uses kurtosis to explain the distribution of the price trend. This is also called statistical volatility. The 
lower and decreasing value of this volatility measure in Table 4 indicates that price distribution has become 
more concentrated towards the mean subsequent to privatisation. As a robustness check, following 
Blanckenburg et al. (2012), a test of the equality of the distribution of the nominal price change between the 
pre-reform (1986–1991) and post-reform/privatisation (1991–2011) periods was undertaken using the 
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Kolmogorov–Smirnov test. The test statistics confirm that the distributions of price changes in pre and 
post reforms and privatisation differ significantly with a p-value of 0.020.  
 
Hence, using these simple screening tools, one could deduce that it is likely that a price-setting mechanism 
was in place after the broad reforms, including privatisation, resulting in the gaining/maintaining of market 
share by a few producer firms. These initial observations, derived from widely used competition indices, 
are useful but a more detailed assessment is carried out subsequently by estimating and interpreting 
sophisticated and more recent indicators of competition and conduct, such as the estimation of overcharge, 
and the competition index (λ). 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
7.2 Overcharge estimates – comparator method 
Table 5 shows the empirical estimates of the “before and after” method described in the methodology 
section. Here, three alternative instrumental variable models are estimated. Overall, the R2 value of each 
model indicates a good fit with the data. The sign and magnitudes of the coefficients do not vary 
significantly across different specifications. These estimates show that overcharge during post reform 
period was approximately 25.71% (= exp(0.2288) -1) and 47.43% (= exp(0.3882) -1) during 1991-95 and 
1996-2011, leading to an average post reforms overcharge estimate of 36.57%. The rising overcharge 
confirms that firms on average charged higher prices as a result of a deterioration in competition levels 
subsequent to privatisation and other broader reforms. These estimates of overcharge are almost similar to 
Connor’s (2005) estimates for cement industry cartels worldwide (mean = 40%, median = 25%).  
 
The higher and persistent overcharge estimates spreading over almost two decades need further 
explanation. Empirical research on collusion and cartel activities has shed some light on the factors which 
could contribute to the duration and stability of collusion/cartel activity. The research has highlighted that 
the extent of overcharge depends on the market environment, including factors such as market share, 
elasticity of demand, number of cartel members and inequality in firm size (Bolotova, 2009). The level of 
cartel overcharge is positively related to cartel market share and is negatively related to the market elasticity 
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of demand. Overcharge also depends on the legal environment and cartel characteristics, such as the 
presence of a third party (trade association). Such a third party presence could in fact reduce monitoring 
costs, leading to an increase in overcharge. In the case of empirical studies on cartels in the US, in 25–50% 
of instances, trade associations have been found to be used to develop monitoring mechanisms for the 
dissemination of information among cartel members. 
  
[Insert table 5 about here] 
 
Similarly, fewer attempts to form cartels are likely to increase overcharge over time. Issues with the stability 
of cartels include bargaining problems (distribution of rent), opportunistic behaviour and the entry of new 
non-member firms in the industry. Entry and bargaining problems are considered to be the root cause of 
cartel failure. Excess capacity could also work as a deterrent to new firm entry. In the presence of excess 
capacity, colluding firms will have significant power in setting prices and output quantities (as a deviating 
firm is punished heavily and this will make deviation less likely). In the case of Pakistan, the issue of excess 
capacity and capacity utilisation in the cement industry has been of great importance since 1996 (see Table 
6). In some cases, due to the interdependence of conglomerates, new firms could gain membership of the 
cartel group within a short period of time. The later part of this empirical section discusses the role of these 
aforementioned factors in detail, specifically with regard to helping producer firms to achieve higher and 
prolonged overcharges and the gradual deterioration in the competitive condition of the cement industry 
over time. 
[Insert table 6 about here] 
 
7.3 Bresnahan’s (1982) approach – estimation of λ 
Equations (2) and (5) are jointly estimated using the 2SLS non-linear full information maximum likelihood 
method, the results of which can be found in Table 7. Similar to other empirical studies estimating the firms 
cost function, homogeneity is imposed on input prices. To observe any change in competitive conditions 
in the two separate periods, i.e. immediately after reform (first five years of the post-reform period) and 
then in subsequent more mature post-reform years, two shift dummy variables are employed: the first 
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dummy takes the value ‘1’ for the period 1991–1995 and ‘0’ otherwise; the second dummy takes the value 
‘1’ for the period 1996–2011 and ‘0’ otherwise.  
 
The empirical model’s theoretical expectations are generally confirmed, with a negative price coefficient (α1 
< 0 and statistically significant), a positive income (GDP growth rate) coefficient (α2 > 0), a negative 
substitute coefficient (α4 < 0) and a downward sloping demand curve (α1 + α3z + α5y < 0). Furthermore, 
for the identification of λ, either α3 or α5 should be significant. In this case, both of these coefficients are 
statistically significant. Overall, the model fits the data well given the fact it uses disaggregated individual 
firm-level data; 14 of the 16 regression coefficients are statistically significant. 
 
[Insert table 7 about here] 
 
The λ value is negative but statistically insignificant. This is evidence that the industry operated under 
competitive conditions prior to reform and privatization. The first shift dummy (λ1991-95), which captures 
the initial period and immediate impact of reform, indicates a decrease in competition, although the 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. The second interactive term (λ1996-11) is statistically 
significant and suggests a degree of market power over the period 1996 onward. This seems to indicate that 
in the latter part of the reform period, there was a decrease in competition and the industry started moving 
away from perfect competition. The sum of λ and the coefficients for the interactive shift dummies indicate 
a degree of post-1991 percentage deviation of aggregate output from the competitive equilibrium level 
regardless of the functional form of demand and supply (Shaffar, 1993, p. 58, footnote 9). This figure is 
38% less than the competitive output level. If firms compete on quantity or make a pre-commitment to 
provide a certain capacity, the Cournot oligopoly model is the better one. The factors such as tacit collusion 
concerning the quantity of the homogenous product sold, relatively fewer firms, a medium to high entry 
barrier and a significant portion of fixed costs, could lead to the Cournot oligopolistic model of 
competition. This perhaps appears to be the case for the Pakistani cement industry subsequent to reforms.  
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In summary, using a wide variety of methodologies to evaluate competitive conditions and conduct of the 
firms, the above discussion of the results can be summarised as: traditional non-parametric measures of 
competition indicate no substantial change in indices subsequent to reform and privatisation suggesting 
that members were agreeing on market share and subsequently maintained this for a very long period. For 
a long time, it has been argued that capacity utilisation rates can be used as a good proxy for observing any 
control on output by colluding members to maintain higher prices. The estimates presented above confirm 
that except for the early years, the industry as a whole exhibits a statistically significant reduction in capacity 
utilisation in the post-reform period. An increase in nominal prices and a reduction in standard deviation 
(variance) over the longer post-reform period can be observed, indicating the presence of anticompetitive 
behaviour. Third and fourth moments measured by the skewness and kurtosis of prices also confirm the 
above. These above mentioned findings to some extent are confirmed by other more advanced methods 
of estimating competition indices. Our overcharge estimates show that cement-producing firms, on 
average, charge a high premium as a result of deterioration in competition levels. Based on Bresnahan’s 
(1982) approach (λ), the conclusions of this study are fairly similar, namely that competition has deteriorated 
since reform and privatisation.  
 
The above findings suggest that of firms’ conduct which is less competitive. The regulator has been unable 
to improve the competitive conditions of the industry after privatisation and broader reforms and enforce 
the existing competition laws to improve the situation. Buccirossi et al. (2013) identified the quality of 
institutions in general and the judicial system in particular as influential in enforcing antitrust laws. In what 
follows, the relevance of these factors and others which could have contributed towards inducing and 
prolonging tacit collusive practices in the Pakistani cement industry is discussed.  
 
Starting with the industry environment, the empirical literature on the stability of collusion supports the 
role of industry-specific exogenous factors. To manage an effective conspiracy, cartels often establish 
committees or secretariats to collect and share market sales intelligence. Alternatively, cartels may be 
operated in tandem with trade associations that perform the same function. These trade associations, by 
pooling information on industry trends, improve a cartel’s ability to anticipate demand shocks, thereby 
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reducing price dispersion (Connor, 2005). In the case of the Pakistani cement industry, the establishment 
of the producer association, APCMA, immediately after privatisation confirms Connor’s (2005) point. 
Furthermore, the roles of opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry has been generally absent 
due to the interdependence of conglomerates and organisation of regular meetings among APCMA 
members. 
  
Private damage actions are non-existent in poor countries such as Pakistan and hence public interference 
remains the only option in challenging collusion and cartel activities. Hence, the role of regulator in curbing 
anticompetitive behaviour of firms is extremely important. In response to increasing reservations and 
criticism, the government constituted a new regulator, the CCP. However, the role played by the new 
regulator in the identification and curbing of monopoly powers has also been widely criticised since its 
establishment. It is commonly understood that the CCP has been unable to curb tacit collusion in a number 
of industries, such as those related to cement, sugar, ghee (cooking oil), automobiles and finance. The 
national newspapers are full of stories on how such collusion is harming consumers’ interests. Occasional 
political interference in the working of the CCP has meant that fines imposed by the Commission are 
difficult to be recovered. Hence, the Commission has been unable to create a viable deterrence for illegal 
anticompetitive practices. The watchdog role of the CCP, in particular, has been seriously compromised 
due to its lack of capacity in terms of conducting technical studies that can be defended in a court of law.  
 
But interestingly, this result of regulator not doing its job well after privatisation and liberalisation is not 
limited to Pakistan only. Some theoretical and empirical studies have recently looked at the regulator not 
performing its role in curbing monopolies after privatsisation and deregulation due to either incentive issues 
or constraints imposed upon by regulatory framework design. The ‘regulatory capture’ examples after 
privatisation and reforms have been mentioned in the Sewol ferry tragedy (You and Park, 2017), increase 
in income inequality in 91 countries (Manish and O’Reilly, 2018), and gasoline prices in Canada (Sen et al, 
2011). Similarly, a growing theoretical and empirical literature has recently started focusing on tight 
institutional capacity constraints imposed on regulator in developing countries in particular. The work of 
Jean-Jacques Laffont (2005) is considered as a pioneering in this regard. The constraints arises in the 
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designing of regulatory framework which shall achieve many goals. A number of studies (theoretical and 
empirical) have however concluded that these goals are difficult to achieve in the context of developing 
countries due to incentive incompatibilities, limited capacity, lack of commitment and accountability and 
fiscal efficiency alongside political concerns.  
 
Similarly, the initiation of public and private damage actions and its effectiveness depends on timely 
decisions by the courts and the judicial system. It has been common practice for decisions taken by 
governments and regulatory authorities to be challenged in the lower and superior courts. The courts have 
generally granted stay orders without hesitation. These have lasted for years and in some cases the 
proceedings on these cases have never restarted or aggrieved parties have stopped following the cases after 
years of waiting. This has resulted in not a single case of successful prosecution on the grounds of 
anticompetitive practices. This has further encouraged firms to initiate and continue these illegal 
anticompetitive practices without any fear of getting caught. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Governments around the world have introduced a number of regulatory reforms, including the transfer of 
ownership of state-owned firms from the public to the private sector with the aim of making these firms 
profitable/efficient and more productive. At the same time, one of the other primary objectives of these 
policies is to create a level playing field for new and existing firms in competing against each other on price, 
supply quantity and quality of the product. However, since the initiation of these reforms in the 1980s, a 
number of studies have concluded that attaining this objective of increasing competition could be difficult 
in developing countries for a variety of reasons. A significant number of firms have manipulated the output 
prices and supply quantity subsequent to privatisation and other broader reforms.  
 
This study has reviewed and used a variety of methods to assess the competitive conditions in the Pakistani 
cement industry, which has been investigated, fined and warned by the regulator due to serious allegations 
of tacit collusion since the introduction of the privatisation policy in 1991/1992. This research uses trends 
and descriptive statistics alongside advanced techniques, such as the “before and after” approach, and 
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market structure-based methods, such as the estimation of Bresnahan’s (1982) lambda. To complete the 
story, it links firms’ conduct to regulatory weaknesses and lack of institutional capacity. 
 
We conclude that subsequent to broader reform and privatisation, and contrary to the main objective of 
promoting competition through these policies, firms have exercised more market power and competition 
levels have been reduced due to tacit collusion. In a way, state monopoly has been replaced with a monopoly 
of business conglomerates. These conglomerates, to some extent, have used all available tools to maintain 
their control over prices and supplied quantity. These include acquiring small and medium-sized firms, 
strengthening/maintaining market share through significant new production capacity additions and 
mergers, the forced exit of competitor firms through exclusionary practices, and manipulating the 
outdated/inefficient regulatory and legal system. The formation of a strong producer association 
immediately after privatisation, which subsequently established an effective mechanism to keep control 
over prices, capacity and supplied quantity at the regional and national levels, has helped this collusion to 
continue over a considerable period of time. 
 
This study argues that broad reforms, including transfer of ownership, will not bring about the desired 
objective of creating a “level playing field” and making the industry competitive without an effective and 
authoritative regulatory framework, an efficient legal system/courts and a reduction in government 
interventions concerning investigations of market abuse by the competition authorities, the recovery of 
fines and follow-up investigations following regulator warnings. The regulatory body also needs to keep a 
close eye on some particular industries, such as cement manufacturing, due to their higher sunk costs, the 
homogeneous and bulky nature of their product and related transportation issues, as well as exclusionary 
practices that are easy to exercise due to the building of larger production capacities, etc.  
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Table 1: Privatisation of state-owned cement manufacturer firms  
Former publically 
owned firm 
 
Initially sold 
 to 
 
Current  
status 
White  Conglomerate.  Continuing -merged with Mapple Leaf cement and later sold to Kohinoor 
mills group Pak Conglomerate Continuing- merged with Mapple Leaf cement and later sold to Kohinoor 
mills group Mapple Leaf  Conglomerate Continuing-sold to Kohinoor mills group 
D.G.Khan  Conglomerate Continuing-sold to Nishat Group 
Dandot   Non conglomerate Continuing- later acquired by Chakwal Group (conglomerate) and is now 
part of Chakwal cement 
Gharibwal  Conglomerate Continuing 
Zeal Pak Non conglomerate Continuing but ceased operation occasionally 
Kohat  Conglomerate Continuing 
National  Non conglomerate Closed  
Thatta  Conglomerate Continuing 
Mustahkam  Conglomerate  Continuing 
Associated , Wah Conglomerate Since 1996, part of Askri cement. 
General Refractories Non conglomerate.  Closed  
Javadan  Non conglomerate Closed 
Associated , Rohri Non conglomerate  Ceased operation in 1999 by the govt. Started operation under private 
ownership after privatisation in 2004 but ceased production again in 
2009 – closed 
Source:  Privatisation Commission (PC), Government of Pakistan and former Expert Advisory Cell, Ministry of Industry, Government of Pakistan 
 
Table 2: Estimation of competitive conditions (traditional measures of competition) 
 
Herfindhal  
index  
(H1) 
Herfindhal  
index  
(H2) 
Herfindhal  
index  
(H3) 
Top 3 Firms  
concentration  
index (C3) 
Price  cost  
margin  
(PCM) 
Weighted 
price cost 
margin  
(WPCM) 
  
  
  
 1986-1991 0.090 0.094 0.087 0.365 0.555 0.565 
1991-1995 0.083 0.084 0.082 0.333 0.580 0.604 
1996-2011 0.087 0.078 0.080 0.378 0.528 0.570   
  
  
 Notes:  H1: Herfindahl index (total assets)  
H2: Herfindahl index (production capacity)  
H3: Herfindahl index (gross sales volume)  
C3= Market share of top 3 firms.  
PCM= (sales-variable cost)/sales 
WPCM is weighted PCM. Weights are determined by market share of firm total assets 
 
Table 3: Capacity utilisation levels of the cement industry 
 
Periods Immediate effect 
(5 years post reform) 
Medium term effect 
(10 years post reform) 
Long term effect 
(20 years post reform)      
Privatised firms 
    
 
Pre reforms and privatisation 92.54 92.54 92.54  
Post reforms and privatisation 102.88 92.09 76.27  
Rank sum test probability 0.008 0.801 0.013 
Publically owned firms 
   
 
Pre reforms and privatisation 92.54 92.54 92.54  
Post reforms and privatisation 80.84 76.26 68.56  
Rank sum test probability 0.957 0.093 0.031 
Privately owned firms   
    
 
Pre reforms and privatisation 95.73 95.73 95.73  
Post reforms and privatisation 118.71 85.72 77.98  
Rank sum test probability 0.009 0.259 0.009      
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Table 4: Evolution of nominal gross prices (Pakistani Rupees per tonne) 
 
1986-1991 1991-1995 1996-1999 2000-2005 2006-2009 2010-2011 1996-2011 
Mean 1599.24 2560.84 3431.12 4036.03 4826.45 4997.29 4185.41 
Skewness 4.46 2.20 0.18 0.22 0.41 -0.22 0.84 
Kurtosis 24.71 9.16 5.06 2.87 2.20 1.65 3.68 
Average number of firms 13 14 17 17 17 15 15 
Note: Gross prices calculated by dividing the gross sales figures (including sales tax and excise duty) by total quantity sold. 
  
Table 5: Estimation of overcharges (dependent variable = log of producer (gross) price per 
tonne) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Dummy variable = 1  (1991-1995) 0.2288*** 0.2382*** 0.2269*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0394) (0.0396) 
Dummy variable = 1  (1996-2011) 0.3882*** 0.3962*** 0.3763*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0633) (0.0635) 
    
R2 0.9237 0.9228 0.9221 
Observations 394 394 394 
Number of firms 21 21 21 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p – value <0.01, ** p – value <0.05, * p – value <0.1. Other variables in the regression include quantity of cement 
sold (log), furnace oil price (log), coal price (log), limestone price (log), workers wage rate (log), firm inefficiency (log), Herfindhal index (log), country export/GDP 
ratio (log), country GDP growth rate (log), firm size =large, time trend (log), firm ownership = privately owned , firm ownership = privatised, firm area of region 
= north, 1/(N+1) where N is number of firms. Instruments includes population, discount rate, workers’ wages, country employment level, manufacturing 
production index, value of exports and firm profitability.  
 
Table 6: An analysis of production capacity, utilisation and surplus  
 
Production 
capacity 
(million  
tones) 
Actual 
production 
(million  
tones) 
Capacity 
utilisation 
(%) 
Surplus 
capacity 
(million  
tones) 
1991-1995 9.18 7.97 87.00 1.21 
1996-2001 14.42 9.63 68.83 4.79 
2002-2006 17.69 14.00 78.20 3.70 
2007-2011 39.63 30.30 76.60 9.33 
Source: Authors compilation from the All Pakistan Cement Manufacturer Association data. Surplus capacity which is the difference between maximum production 
capacity (what could be maximum produced by the given technology) and actual production represents unutilised capacity.    
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Table 7: Estimates of demand and supply parameters and market power index () (full information 
maximum likelihood 2SLS)  
Parameter Variables Parameter 
estimate 
Standard  
error 
t 
value 
p – value 
 
     
α0 intercept (demand equation 2) 3.373931 0.2333 14.46 <.0001 
α1 price of cement (𝑝) -0.00091 0.000047 -19.33 <.0001 
α2 GDP growth rate (𝑦)  0.112739 0.0510 2.21 0.0276 
α3 𝑝 ∗ 𝑧 0.000086 5.103E-6 16.80 <.0001 
α4 construction activity growth (𝑧) 
Type equation here. 
-0.37548 0.0246 -15.27 <.0001 
α5 𝑝 ∗ 𝑦 -0.00006 0.000010 -5.62 <.0001 
α6 𝑦 ∗ 𝑧 0.0098 0.00226 4.34 <.0001 
 lambda -0.02307 0.0384 -0.60 0.5479 
1 intercept (supply equation 5) -2.37249 0.9458 -2.51 0.0125 
2 log of quantity produced/sold (𝑞) 0.179218 0.0112 15.94 <.0001 
3 log of yearly employee wage rates (ω1) 0.668115 0.0604 11.07 <.0001 
4 log of price of furnace oil (ω2) -0.33191 0.0645 -5.15 <.0001 
5 log of price of coal (ω3) 0.421161 0.1672 2.52 0.0121 
6 log of price of limestone (ω4) -0.2243 0.0465 -4.82 <.0001 
1991-1995 Dummy variable=1 for the period 1991-95  0.135619 0.0887 1.53 0.1269 
1996-2011 Dummy variable=1 for the period 1996-2011 0.273499 0.0762 3.59 0.0004 
Adj. R2 for demand and supply equations 
𝑞 Quantity of cement produced/sold 0.2624    
𝑝 Price of cement 0.0693    
Notes: System of two non-linear equations estimated by two stage least square (2SLS) by using following instruments: GDP growth rate (%), development 
expenditures (billion rupees), central bank base rate (%) measured by discount rate, total population of the country (million), construction growth (%), firm 
output (level and square), input prices (ω1) to (ω4) (level, square and interactions), dummy variable =1 for public ownership, firm age (years), firm export 
quantity (tones), and yearly dummies. 
 
Figure 1: Development of nominal cement price (per tonne) and its standard deviation 
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